Copyright Sociological Research Online, 2001


Gabriella Lazaridis and Maria Koumandraki (2001) 'Youth Citizenship and Unemployment: The Case of Passive and Active Labour Market Policies towards the Young Unemployed in Greece'
Sociological Research Online, vol. 5, no. 4, <>

To cite articles published in Sociological Research Online, please reference the above information and include paragraph numbers if necessary

Received: 5/10/2000      Accepted: 26/2/2001      Published: 28/2/2001


This article concentrates on youth transitions into the labour market in one EU member state, Greece. The aim is to explore ways in which the Greek state has responded to the problem of youth unemployment, looking at policies (passive and active) introduced to address this. It reveals that state policies and social norms deeply embedded in the Greek culture, rather than encouraging acquisition of 'full-citizenship' and financial independence, restrict young people's chances for independence from the family. As is the case in other southern European countries, in Greece, the family and informal clientelistic networks of relatives and friends have acted as the primary source of economic and social support for young people. We argue that four co-centric circles circumscribe the type of citizenship available to a young person and have implications for young people's acquisition of full citizenship and financial independence: (a) the family, (b) friends and acquaintances, (c) changes in the labour market and (d) opportunities offered to the young unemployed through passive (benefits, social assistance) and active (vocational training) labour market policies available. With regard to young peoples' ability tobecome financially independent, these either exercise a centrifugal force,encouraging dependency upon others (especially parents and close friends) for care, guidance and support, or a centripetal force, encouraging them to assume full rights and responsibilities of adulthood.

Employment; Social Policy; Southern Europe; Unemployment; Welfare; Youth; Youth Citizenship


The economic recessions and restructuring that have taken place in the European and global labour markets since the 1970s, brought about job losses, poverty and social exclusion (Brown and Crompton 1994). As youth unemployment dramatically increased in some[1] north-western European countries, such as UK, France, Belgium, Finland, and from the 1980s onwards, in southern Europe (see Table 1), youth transitions into the labour market became more difficult, complex and prolonged than in the past.

There have been a variety and contrasting explanations on the causes of high youth unemployment rates in the European context (for example, in the case of UK, Rees and Atkinson 1982; Lynch 1984; Jackson 1985; Hart 1988; Antal 1990; Deakin 1995; Orszag and Snower 1997). Two broad types of explanation can be identified: those based on the characteristics and attitudes of young people (job search explanations[2]; blame the victim approach[3]; voluntary unemployment approach[4]); and those that locate the problem in the changing socio-economic context from the 1970s onwards, as a reflection of economic recession and restructuring that have been taking place in Europe and internationally during the last three decades.

The psychological, economic and societal consequences of youth unemployment have been extensively studied (Furnham 1994; Petersen and Mortimer 1994; Jackson 1985; Allen and Waton 1986; Green et al 1997). Such studies have shown that young people experience either 'extended' or 'fractured' transitions (Wallace 1987; Allatt and Yeadle 1992; Fend 1994; Coles 1995; Williamson 1997a).

'Extended transitions refer to the fact that the attainment of employment, leaving home and setting up new households in the 1990s is much more likely to take place at a later age than in previous decades ... [and that] young people are economically dependent upon their families for longer periods of time ... Fractured transitions refer to situations in which young people move from one status position, without managing to attain a secure, stable or positive outcome in another. So, for instance, young people may leave education but not obtain a job ... At their worst, fractured transitions result in long-term and chronic unemployment, dislocation and estrangement from families, and homelessness' (Coles 1995:30- 31).

This article concentrates on youth transitions into the labour market in one EU member state, Greece. The aim is not to record the diversity of experiences of Greek young unemployed (eg: school drop outs, single-mothers, disabled etc)[5], but to explore ways in which the Greek state has responded to the problem of youth unemployment in general, looking at policies (passive and active) introduced to address this. It reveals that state policies and social norms deeply embedded in the Greek culture, rather than encouraging acquisition of 'full-citizenship' and financial independence, restrict young people's chances for independence from the family. As is the case in other southern European countries, in Greece, the family and informal clientelistic networks of relatives and friends have acted as the primary source of economic and social support for young people. We argue that four co-centric circles circumscribe the type of citizenship available to a young person and have implications for young people's acquisition of full citizenship and financial independence: (a) the family, (b) friends and acquaintances, (c) changes in the labour market and (d) opportunities offered to the young unemployed through passive (benefits, social assistance) and active (vocational training) labour market policies available. With regard to young peoples' ability to become financially independent, these either exercise a centrifugal force, encouraging dependency upon others (especially parents and close friends) for care, guidance and support, or a centripetal force, encouraging them to assume full rights and responsibilities of adulthood.

Conceptualising 'Youth' and 'Youth Citizenship'

Concepts such as 'youth' and 'youth citizenship' are socially constructed. Their definition changes over time and must be understood within a particular historical and cultural context (Jones and Wallace 1992:3). In the literature one can only find a general agreement that 'youth' is an intermediate stage between childhood and adulthood, a transitory stage before reaching adulthood and full integration into society (Jones and Wallace, 1992:3). Such a definition, of course, begs the question as to what we mean by childhood and adulthood, and where the demarcation line between the two is. Statisticians and policy makers have used a chronological age as a bench mark, eg: those aged fifteen to twenty- five, the lower age band representing the minimum school leaving age (Blakely, 1990:15). Although this type of definition is useful for statistical purposes, it has been criticised for being arbitrary (Coleman 1992; Coles 1995; Harris 1989:37; Jones and Wallace 1992). 'Terms such as "adolescence" or "adulthood" are related to life course events and social relationships, and are relatively loosely associated with physical age ... Youth in particular, is a process of definition and re-definition enacted between young people and their families, their peers and the institutions of the wider society' (Jones and Wallace, 1992:4).

Coles (1995:8) identifies three 'main transitions of youth': First, the transition from full- time education and training to a full-time job in the labour market (school-to-work transition). Second, the transition from family of origin to family of destination (the domestic transition). Third, the transition from residence with parents to living away from them (housing transition). These three main youth transitions are shaped by a variety of factors, such as the labour market and economic changes at both national and international levels. Moreover, state policies (economic and social) contain opportunity structures (in terms of education, training and welfare), that shape youth transitions and thus prescribe a variety of choices for young people. These vary not only between countries but also within one country. 'The full rights and responsibilities of adulthood are given gradually, and at different ages in different countries, while parents and legal guardians are expected and required to help young people make their transition to full adult status' (Coles 1995:6). In this way, young people are granted a 'hybrid' status of 'both semi- dependency and semi-independency' (ibid:7).

With regard to law, in some countries, the law does not provide a clear cut definition of 'youth'. In Greece, for example, some rights and responsibilities are granted earlier than others. For example, the legal right to engage in employment is given at the age of 14, the right to leave school and the right to marry (with the parents' consent) at 16, whereas the rights to vote and to drive a car are delayed until the age of 18. These examples illustrate that even in one country, there is no clear end to the status of childhood and no clear age at which young people are given full adult rights and responsibilities. Moreover, many rights and responsibilities are dependent not only upon chronological age but are also status contingent. For example in Greece, young people are entitled to free medical treatment and special prices on public transport, while in education. According to Coleman (1992:21), this uncertainty of status fact has considerable effects, as it 'often serves to place young people in positions where they have very little power and where damaging stereotypes can flourish easily'.

Moreover, young people are often seen as sucked into an underclass, at the bottom of the social heap[6]. For some, the alleged formation of the youth underclass 'constitutes an ideological smokescreen which ... diverts attention from government culpability, presenting "public issues" of policy failure as "personal issues" of degeneracy and moral turpitude' (Craine 1997:130). Others (Baldwin, Coles and Mitchell, 1997) have stressed that it homogenises the experiences of young people and fails to take into consideration the multiple processes of exclusion and the diversity/difference of the groups and individuals being affected. Yet others (Roberts, 1997), have tried to combine culturalist and structural accounts and identify the youth underclass in terms of its social-structural factors (economic exclusion) as well as in terms of cultural factors (shared values, activities, cultural outlooks). According to Roberts (1997:43-44), young people in Britain have survived unemployment through receiving 'financial, social and emotional' support from their families. However, he acknowledges that young people whose parents are unemployed and come from single-parent households experience higher risk of long-term unemployment; this combined with lifestyle factors separate them from the employed and their culture often acts as an additional impediment to their absorption into the working population (ibid:55).

What is it about the social conditions of youth in Greece that lead them to be or not to be considered as key members of an alleged underclass? As we shall show below, young people in Greece experience social, economic and political conditions different to those encountered by their west-European counterparts. Family life, education, state welfare system in Greece have all shaped the social situation of youth in such a way that despite the rapid decline of employment opportunities in the formal labour market, school leavers still manage to survive. Supportive family networks and clientelistic networks open the doors to better education and employment futures, which in turn provide the resources that enable them to carve out successful paths. Of course not all 'survive'. Young people whose parents are unemployed or come from single-parent households are especially disadvantaged, experience higher risk of long-term unemployment compared to their peers. However, although the experiences of young unemployed differ, it is important to understand the structural processes that operate and examine what kind of career paths they circumscribe. Finally one has to be aware of the limitations and dangers of adopting the American or British notion of the underclass in understanding the position of young Greek people; in the case of Greece, for example, familialism and patronage function as a safety valve which, by en large, protects young people from joining the ranks of the underclass.

The Case of Greece

Like other Southern European member states, youth transitions in the Greek labour market seem to have been moving towards the same directions as their north-western counterparts. The youth unemployment rate in Greece started to dramatically increase in the late 1980s[7]. In the early 1990s it reached one of the highest levels among EU member states - (see Table 2 and Graph 1). In 1998, for example, the rate was 29.8% and it was the third higher after Spain (35.3%), Italy (33.8%). Young women are particularly vulnerable; in the period 1986-1998, the unemployment rate for young women was double to that of young men (see Graph 2) in most EU countries. Moreover, long term unemployment rates are particularly high for young people (younger than 25), that is 13.6% in 1995 compared to 3.9% and 1.1% for those aged 25-54 and 55 plus, respectively (OECD 1995 cited in Demekas and Kontolemis 1997a:94).

The expansion of education and training and the increasing number of young people remaining in upper secondary and higher education beyond the age of 16 (see Graph 3), have meant that fewer and fewer go straight into employment after leaving school. Despite this, educational attainment can no longer guarantee a smooth transition into the labour market[8]. The high level of youth unemployment in Greece among individuals with a high human capital and higher educational qualifications [33,4% in 1991(Demekas and Kontolemis 1997a:90)], demonstrates that educational attainment that traditionally (eg: in the 1960s and 1970s) secured a job and upward social mobility has lost its value. It also suggests that young people are reluctant in lowering their expectations and accepting a job not on a par with their qualifications and skills and aspirations for upward social mobility. Such aspirations are shared by the family which is willing to support young people over long periods of time, 'mehri to pedi na bri tin doulia pou tou teriazi' 'until the child finds a suitable job'.

Unlike North-Western member sates of the EU, the psychological, economic and societal consequences of youth unemployment in Greece and the responses of young people to these changes remain largely unstudied. It is only recently that the problem has attracted some attention and this is related to the EU's initiatives to gather information on vocational training and guidance available to young people across Europe (Rajan 1990; Lazos 1995; Mingione and Contiero UNDATED; Zanni-Teliopoulou 1995; CEDEFOP 1992a; CEDEFOP 1992b; CEDEFOP 1995; CEDEFOP 1997). Such studies indicate that similar to young people in other member states of the EU, young people in Greece experience either 'extended' or 'fractured' transitions. Attainment of employment, leaving home and setting up new households is much more likely to take place at a later age than in previous decades. Some experience what one can call the 'revolving door entrapment' of training schemes, unemployment or employment in the Greek parallel economy and yet more training schemes. So, in Greece one can observe Craine's (1997:137) patterns of 'post-school' progression: 'traditional[9]', 'protracted[10]' and 'cyclical[11]'. However, the phenomenon of 'anti- employment careers' does not seem to be as widespread as in Craine's case-study, where there is a high correlation between long-term unemployment and youth crime (Craine 1997:149). In addition, single motherhood is not an option for the young Greek women; this can be attributed to the lack of state support for young lone mothers and the 'honour and shame' value system which makes lone parenthood a not socially acceptable choice (see Lazaridis 1995).

Before discussing the peculiarities of the measures introduced to deal with youth unemployment, we need to briefly look at the development of the socio-economic and political structures as these influence considerably the nature of the welfare state, the direction of youth transitions and young people's acquisition of social citizenship.

Socio-Economico-Political Structures and the Greek Welfare State: a Schematic Overview

Although it has been argued that the Greek welfare state has elements of the 'corporatist/continental' welfare regime (see Katrougalos 1996), this ideal type cannot capture and explain its peculiarities. Here, we will adopt Ferrera's (1996) point of view that Southern European welfare states share common elements - in particular a 'dualism' of social protection, statism/clientelism and familialism - which distinguishes them both from the 'continental' and the 'liberal' welfare states of the north-western countries of the EU. They belong, following Ferrera (1996), to the 'Southern European model of welfare[12]'.

The Greek welfare state has developed under different circumstances and has followed a different trajectory to that followed by its north-western counterparts[13] (Maloutas and Economou 1988; Petmezidou 1991 and 1996; Symeonidou 1995; Stathopoulos 1996:137-139). In the 1950s and 1960s, and till the late 1970s the country experienced rapid economic growth, 'averaging 8% per year' (Katrougalos 1996:48), which was, to a certain extent, the outcome of structural changes in the economy, reflecting a late industrialisation, followed by a rapid shift to post-Fordism without passing through a stage of intense industrialisation. Nowadays, the tertiary sector is the larger sector, employing 46% of all persons in employment. 21% of the labour force is still employed in agriculture (compared to 8% in Italy, 10% in Spain and 12% in Portugal [Petmesidou 1996:328]), while the secondary sector remains underdeveloped, in that 'less than one fifth of those in employment, work in manufacturing...Within the tertiary sector most of the employment, is trade (both wholesale and retail), restaurants and hotels, and miscellaneous services (mostly public employment)' (Karantinos et al 1992:22-23).

Among the four south European countries, Greece has the highest rate of self-employed (47% of the labour force) compared to 29% in Italy, 26% in Spain and 27% in Portugal (Petmezidou 1996:328-329). While small family-based enterprises have flourished, 'the proportion of salaried and waged workers remaining the lowest in the Community' (Karantinos et al 1992:107). Another characteristic of the Greek labour market is high involvement in the informal sector and multi-occupation. In 1990, for example, 58% of salary and wage earners held on a regular basis a second job to make up for real wage losses (Karantinos et al 1992: 18).

The state has been the main means for the creation and appropriation of income, wealth and revenue; it functions as an employer of the first resort, often in a parasitic way. This, 'together with the widespread ideology that everything is a matter of politics, has often led "to the open use of political means by the contending parties for getting access to benefits" and resources' (Petmezidou 1996:329). One could give various examples of discretionary appropriation of resources and benefits which can then be distributed within one's family. These include '...informal economic activities tolerated by the state, the abuse of invalidity benefits, or even "discretionary" granting of other types of social benefits and subsidies on a particularistic-clientelistic basis' (Petmezidou 1996:330). Thus, the mode of functioning of the state in Greece (and in other southern European countries) is distinct from that of their European counterparts, 'with significant allocative and distributive implications' (Ferrera 1996:25). Most typically, however, welfare manipulation takes the form of political clientelism (Ferrera 1996:25). Usually votes were given to a particular party for the recruitment of one's family member in the civil service or for gaining discretionary access to benefits and other resources[14]. This practice has, since WWII, been widespread and still remains to a considerable degree a common and accepted practice for securing a job in the civil service. So 'who' you know is more important that 'what' you know[15].

'Closely linked with this statist/clientelistic mode of welfare provision is the role of family/household as a key unit in redistribution... the family/household constitutes a strategic unit of decision-making regarding the employment opportunities and welfare of its members. Family strategies combine formal and informal economic activities, private and public employment, and efforts to improve their members' access to clientelistic clusters and discretionary benefits' (Petmezidou 1996:330).

Young people whose families and kin fail to ensure a 'traditional' post-school transition (Craine 1997:137) by securing a position in the civil service for them, end up experiencing a more 'protracted' transition (ibid) by taking up irregular activities which are rarely vocational oriented, or even if they are, these fall short of young people's expectations and hence, are likely to move from periods of sub-employment (unstable work) to periods of unemployment. The family often constitutes the primary source of support for the young unemployed and acts as a safety valve against what Craine (1997:138) calls a 'cyclical' post-school transition and eventual slide into labour market withdrawal and rejection and turning into, what Williamson (1997b) calls a 'Status Zer0' youth[16], for whom the underclass may become a social reality. In addition, Greece is a country with high levels of cohabitation of young people with their families. The transition from residence with parents to living away from home occurs at a relatively later stage of one's life, and coincides with getting married and starting a new family. The family, in other words, plays a crucial role in the provision of welfare services. This, in turn, strongly affects the youth labour market in that, as we argue below, a coherent and systematic youth employment policy was until recently, non-existent in Greece (see below). In addition, Greece is a country with high levels of cohabitation of young people with their families. The transition from residence with parents to living away from home occurs at a relatively later stage of one's life, and coincides with getting married and starting a new family.

The socio-economic and political structures mentioned above, have hardly favoured the development of a universalist culture and universal social citizenship. This makes vulnerable groups more at risk, since a well organised employment policy targeting the young is lacking.

Passive Measures for the Young Unemployed

In Greece, there is no national non-contributory minimum income scheme for individuals and families with insufficient resources[17] (European Commission 1999a: 458). 'Thus, a person who is neither old nor an individual with special needs, but has neither a job nor contributory entitlements nor source of income, is not entitled to any support from the state, as evidence of low income and of living in poverty are not in themselves enough to entitle one to any support from the state' (Ferrera 1996: 20). There is available an unemployment benefit scheme for first time job seekers aged between 20 and 29 years and for some repatriate groups (European Commission 1999a: 412, 518).

Young people who have not worked are not entitled to receive unemployment benefit. The only benefit given to those aged between 20 and 29 is of short duration (five months only) and rather modest (Law 1545/1985), that is approximately one fifth of the minimum salary Eligible are those that have been registered as unemployed within three months after having completed either their 20th year of age or their military service or obtained a degree, or quitted their studies; the benefit is granted after having remained for a year unemployed or having earned less that 80 wages within a year (interview with OAED). Because the benefits available are meagre, arguments of a youth underclass relying on welfare and exhibiting a 'welfare dependency' are of no analytical value in the Greek context.

The gap in social protection by the public sector is filled by other sectors, namely the family and kin - parents have the obligation to support their children until they get full-employment - as well as other particularistic networks, the informal sector and the Greek Orthodox church (Leontidou 1993; Symeonidou 1995; Cavounidis 1996; Karantinos et al 1992:32-40; Katrougalos 1996:56; Chtouris 1992). These circumscribe different opportunities and risks for Greek youth inclusion in comparison with their peers in north-western Europe.

Active Labour Market Policies

A coherent and systematic policy is lacking in Greece. The low unemployment rates of the 1970s and 1980s (see Table 1) provide a partial explanation. Although 'spending on labour market programmes has increased rapidly [in the 1980s] between 1985 and 1987 public expenditure on such programmes increased by 63% in nominal terms' (Karantinos et al 1992:27; Stathopoulos 1996) - this still remains the lowest in the EU, 'absorbing 0.39% of the GDP in 1992' (Katrougalos 1996:54). As regards active employment measures such as vocational training and subsidised employment, these are rather rudimentary when compared with other EU countries, such as Portugal (0,33%, 0,07%), Denmark (0,47%, 0,43%), Germany (0,42, 0.34%), France (0,44%, 0.26%) and Ireland (0.48%, 0.43%), amounting to only 0.16% and 0.08% respectively of the GDP in the early 1990s (OECD 1995, cited in Petmezidou 1996:341).

The active labour market policies (training, subsidised employment) in operation since the late 1980s are mainly funded from the European Social Fund (ESF)[18]. These mainly aim at providing vocational training to young people with no qualifications (school drop outs) and at helping those who have skills to update them, as well as promoting self-employment (Symes 1995:40). They came about as part of the European Community's transition programme (1982-1987) aiming at facilitating the integration into the labour market for those aged 14 to 18 (Blakely 1990:16). An integrated approach started to emerge from 1989 onwards, when the social dimension of the then European Community was advanced further. Young people also benefited under the Social Charter of 1989 which Greece had signed; they were to be entitled to 'initial vocational training of a sufficient duration to enable them to adapt to the requirements of their future working life' (point 23). In addition, a number of other Community initiatives were introduced[19]. For instance, YOUTHSTART 1 aimed at young people aged 16-20 and YOUTHSTART 2 at those aged 16-24 who have problems with change from the school to adult and working life[20]. The EU brought, from top-down, the problem of youth unemployment in the forefront of the political debate and agenda for action. It identified young people as one of the groups especially encountering problems in the labour market, a cohort of need of special attention. Some, have argued that some of the above mentioned programmes have benefited a limited number of young Europeans (Popple and Kirby 1995:164-165) and that these need to be expanded in order to be able to meet the challenge of high 'youth' unemployment rates in the member states of the EU.

Turning our attention to national efforts, the Greek Manpower Employment Organisation (OAED) in the 1990s gave subsidies to employers for hiring young unemployed (aged between 18 and 25), and to young people for creating their own micro-businesses, especially if it was to be set up in a 'high in unemployment area' (de-industrialised areas such as Lavrion, North Evia, Patra etc) (interview with OAED). Since the late 1980s the resources for vocational training schemes have been increasing, as European Community aid helped to increase the percentage of GDP devoted to education by an average of 0.22%, and contributed to the introduction of some active labour market measures (European Commission 1995:22).

During the implementation of the First Support Framework, a large number (over one million) of fictitious centres for vocational training (KEKs), sprang up. These totally lacked any experience and know-how in organising and delivering such training courses. Their primary aim was to appropriate financial resources available from the ESF 'while workers and the unemployed co-operate to this collusive manipulation in return for a meagre benefit' (Petmezidou 1996:342). The picture has slightly improved since the implementation of the Second Support Framework (1994-1999); this is due to the introduction of a new law aiming at rationalising vocational training by allowing only certified centres to deliver training courses (ibid).

Greece received from the initiative YOUTHSTART (1994-1999) 14,030,000 ECU (interview with Ministry of Labour). In particular, 32 projects were approved in the period 1994-6 and 48 in the period 1997-9 (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 1998; 1996; National Labour Institute 1996). As can be seen from Table 3, there was a regional distribution of these programmes, some of which were multi-regional. An evaluation of these projects and their success in combating youth unemployment is, however, lacking. Moreover, the institutions[21] responsible for the implementation of the programmes do not keep detailed records of who benefited and in what way. Lack of monitoring mechanisms of the implementation process, efficient data collection on local labour market and availability of jobs, regular official reports on the national state of demand for labour, mean that the capacity for judging the potential benefits of the training programmes introduced via the YOUTHSTART initiative, are limited (interview with officials in the National Institute of Labour).

There is no available date for the number of people who participated in YOUTHSTART I; only 714 participated in the training programmes under YOUTHSTART II; 206 of them were trained to work as consultants and trainers within these programmes; therefore the number of young people trained with the aim to find a job, was relatively small. When it comes to evaluating the effectiveness of training and other employment related measures, the number of those who succeed in finding a job is a key indicator of success or failure. The data from YOUTHSTART I show that only a small number (39) of participants got employment and only two benefited from initiatives encouraging self- employment (National Labour Institute 1998:6-8). Why? The answer lies with implementation problems.

Youthstart: Problems with Implementation[22]

The implementation suffers from problems deeply rooted in the policy styles and organisational structures of the Greek administrative system as well as an over-developed state apparatus, playing a dominant part in the economy and society. Difficulties range from infrastructural problems to attitudes of officials and policy makers, to problems faced by the target groups. It is to these problems that we will now turn our attention.

(a) One of the problems is lack of continuation of funding for their implementation (interview with officials in GGLE). 'As long as there is funding, the programme operates; once the funding expires, the programme "expires" too ... ' (interview, ministry of Labour). Thus a major problem that arises is the economic 'survival' of established institutions, such as careers information centres, counselling centres, as no effort is made either at the national or local level to develop ways of supporting these financially.

In addition, the tardiness in distribution of funds often results in inter-agency conflicts over allocation of funds and in serious delays in implementation (interviews with officials from EIYAPOE). Officials we interviewed in the Ministry of Labour attribute this delay to the failure of the respective agencies to meet deadlines set for submitting all relevant documents. This argument is however, directly related to the next problem of consideration, the administrative structure.

(b) The administrative structure accounts for much of the problems of introducing effective policies. Lack of good co-ordination and effective collaboration between the different agencies involved, affect implementation. As a key informant put it, 'from my experience I have seen that there is bad co-ordination between agencies involved ... And then the budgets are broken down and everyone is doing the same thing ... there is no archive in Greece for keeping records of who is doing what .... as a result both money and time are wasted ...' (interview with EIYAPOE). The actions taken by official agencies are often fragmentary and short-sighted (interviews with INE/GSEE, GGLE). Thus 'different agencies [often] submit independently proposals for the same subject, in the same field, for the same target group instead of working together ...' (interview with GGLE). There is also lack of cross-fertilisation between the different programmes implemented under the YOUTHSTART initiative. 'They are introverted, they do not want to share their experiences and exchange ideas with other similar programmes that are currently implemented' (interview Labour Institute of General Confederation of Greek Workers INE/GSEE).

In addition, lack of co- ordination between inter-agency and centre-periphery levels, means difficulties in introducing effective administration into traditional bureaucracies. Some key informants stressed the lack of adequate administrative structure in the periphery with respect to know-how and resources, which makes it difficult for them to implement new procedures. This is exacerbated by the involvement of 'decorative' partners[23] - often an add on appendix to make the up numbers - who play a non-active role in the implementation process. Furthermore, a lack of participation of social actors and private businesses was common in most of these programmes. Moreover, programmes local authorities were involved in, suffered from a change of actors after elections due to the preferential patronage appointments system. Institutional adaptation is generally slow and this is reflected in the personnel's approach to problem-solving and policy outlook. Long delays due to the Kafkian nature of the Greek bureaucracy, bureaucratic lethargy and the weakness of efficiency values and professional competence and widespread clientelistic practices were among of the problems stressed by key informants. The rationalisation of the local bureaucracy is necessary.

(c) Other problems touching upon issues of efficiency relate to lack of institutionalised channels of contact and strategies of consultation with the target groups and ill dissemination of information. ' .. The Ministry of Labour is only interested in publicising an official proclamation for a programme in the local press, which the target group are not likely to spot. This is unacceptable ....' (interview with GGLE). Target groups were approached and treated as a group rather than individual persons with different needs. This is further exacerbated by the lack of personnel with the necessary know-how and qualifications; hence a social worker may be preparing accountancy forms or carrying our other administrative tasks in one programme while an accountant plays the social worker's role in another.

A major problem in YOUTHSTART 1 was the 16-20 age limit, which by definition excluded young Greek men who did not finish high school and joined the army at the age of 18. Therefore more girls benefited from YOUTHSTART 1 than boys, 'despite the fact that it is boys from poor households who drop out of school' (interview with key informant). From the boys who participated, the majority were high school graduates and young people from rural areas. The programme therefore did not benefit the 'Status Zer0' youth, that is those young men not in education, training or employment with no family backing, who suffer from unjust inadequate government policies described above.

Another problem is that these policies are geared towards first-job seekers with no qualifications, playing the role of the once upon a time apprenticeship. They fail to address the problem of youth 'intellectual unemployment', as well as the problems faced by those who have had a job but found themselves amongst the ranks of the unemployed. In practice, these were seen as a time filler rather than as a way of acquiring some experiential resources to be used in a future work career. Also, there is the problem of 'value' of the qualifications and skills acquired under these schemes. A key informant in the ministry of Labour stressed that laws should be introduced acknowledging the certificates obtained through training as 'proper' educational qualifications (interview, Ministry of Labour). Moreover, training hours exclude by default those who are casually employed in the informal economy. In addition, there is no research on the work available in the local setting in order to match the training to this.

Another problem is that most of those who join these programmes join them for the wrong reasons; as an interviewee put it: 'Some join vocational training programmes and they do not even realise in which programme they are ... not even the title ... believe me .... I have interviewed people and I asked them "in which programme would you like to participate" and they do not know what to answer ... They come for the subsidy ... they have financial problems' (INE/GSEE). Another interviewee added: 'they are unemployed, they have to survive' (Ministry of Labour). In addition, personalistic relationships between Greece's political parties and its citizens often determine who joins which programme and why.

(d) The YOUTHSTART programme has appeared at a time of widespread protest and general dissatisfaction with the present educational reforms. Public information can clearly play a significant role, issuing reports and publicity on vocational training. The overwhelming emphasis on formal education however, does not allow for pressure group sensitivity in so far as vocational training is concerned. As a key informant from the INE/GSEE said: 'there is of course the attitude that "we must help" someone, but the idea that there should be provision for vocational training necessary for someone to be able to find a job, is lacking.... one should not, in other words be forced to follow the classical methods [she means manipulation of clientelistic networks] ... but via these programmes we must offer specialised training, the type of training necessary to meet these peoples' needs. Our attitude must change from 'let us help this poor kid', to 'this person has the ability to get inserted into society, what we need therefore to give him/her is something [training] which suits him/her ... not, 'we will teach him something and if s/he manages to get inserted fine, if not ...well... '' (interview, INE/GSEE). An evaluation of the first phase of YOUTHSTART would have been helpful in identifying who benefited and who did not; this however, is not yet available and it is too early to make any estimates for the second phase.

Political and social actors as well as economic actors play a significant part in policy implementation. The impact of these programmes on public opinion is, however, difficult to estimate. A gradual societal response is likely to emerge in the light of the likely increase in youth unemployment in the future. Crucial to this will be the way in which the different actors interact among themselves and with the Greek state. Politicians are convinced that jobs do win votes. The problem is to convince them that these job opportunities should be offered via training and re-training rather than via carefully crafted manipulation of clientelist networks.

Concluding Remarks

In this article, we examined both passive measures (benefits, social assistance) and active labour market benefits (emphasis on training) available to young unemployed people. We have shown that particularly with reference to passive measures, a social policy vacuum exists, with lack of income support schemes for long-term unemployed in general and social assistance schemes for young unemployed.

The family's role as a primary source of economic and social support had an impact on youth transitions, in that it prolonged economic dependence of young people on their parents. The weak welfare structures along with statism/clientelism and familialism have created a cultural environment which has had a centrifugal force onto young people's ability to acquire full citizenship and independence. Due to lack of a social assistance scheme, the family and informal networks of relatives and friends are the main providers of psychological, emotional and economic support for the young. The gap in social protection along with the existence of an informal economy, has led young people to engage in informal activities or combine both formal and informal activities to generate some income, while at the same time, together with their families, try to enhance their access to political/clientelistic networks and thus obtain a secure and permanent job, especially in the civil service. In this context, young people's access to employment is influenced by and seems to be dependent on their family's economic resources, political bargaining power and social capital. This has detrimental effects on their acquisition of full citizenship. Young Greeks gain 'citizenship by proxy', that is their citizenship rights are compromised by their economic dependence on familial resources.

Entry into adult life has become more difficult for those who face uncertainty, with considerable implications for transition; such transitions of course are influenced by the historical, cultural context of society, which creates different structures of opportunity for the young unemployed. For example, transitions have not culminated into homelessness, as in other parts of Europe, as strong family ties and the informal economy have acted as 'absorbers' of the crisis and a safety valve against the emergence of what Wilkinson (1995) calls a 'drop-out-society'. Thus, in the Greek context, one cannot argue in favour of an emerging youth underclass, or of 'underwolves' (Wilkinson and Mulgan 1995).

Regarding active labour market policies, we looked at the introduction of some vocational training courses and programmes, financed to a large extent by the European Social Fund, such as Youthstart I and II. We have identified some problems with the implementation of YOUTHSTART which meant its failure to achieve the full integration of the young in the country's economic life. A new policy should be introduced which would 'try to integrate all aspects of the process of integration of young people in adult life, including education and training, experimentation and discovery, guidance and orientation, economic autonomy, cultural, social and political participation, creativity and openness' (Fragniere and Doorten 1983:11). A prerequisite to improve the effectiveness of existing policies is to have a more efficient administration, with clear distinction between the roles and responsibilities of the institutions involved; moreover, it is imperative that a transparent structure of intervention is introduced which will enable and facilitate the effective monitoring and evaluation of these policies. Although an attempt has been made to decentralise labour market policies at the regional and local levels, and to encourage the co-operation between public and private organisations, this has not resulted in the cost effective use of available funds... Such attempts must cut across particularistic-clientelistic forms of social organisation. The so called 'political credentials' and/or 'contacts' as the main means for getting access to such courses must be replaced by an axiocratic system which will promote inclusion on the basis of their needs and citizenship rights rather than on the basis of their family's and kin's political bargaining power. Today, despite the still wide legitimation for statist ideology and practice, and the relatively strong family solidarity, the role of the family as 'a primary support unit for individuals against unemployment' often acts as a centrifugal force towards young people who seek employment. The new policies must therefore try to counteract this centrifugal force, and transform it into a centipetal one, so that young people become independent from their families.

Tables and Graphs

Table 1: Unemployment rates (percentage of civilian labour force) in the member states of the EU-15: 1960- 1999

Source: European Commission (1999b:104-105)

Table 2: Youth Unemployment Rates (%) in the EU-15, 1986- 1998 (seasonally adjusted)

Note: * data not available Sources: Data for 1986, 1989 - Eurostat (1990:45); for 1992, 1993 - Eurostat (1994); for 1998 - Eurostat (2000:61)

Table 3: Implementation of Youthstart I : 1994-1996 and Youthstart II: 1997-1999 training programmes across the regions
RegionsYouthstart I YOUTHSTART II
Macedonia and Thrace97
Ionia nisia01
Sterea Ellada and Attiki615
Nisia Agaiou12

Source: for YOUTHSTART I: National Labour Institute (1996);for YOUTHSTART II: National Labour Institute (1999a, 1999b)

Graph 1 : Youth unemployment rates (%) in Southern European countries, 1986- 1998 (seasonally adjusted)

Sources: Data for 1986-1989 - Eurostat (1990:45); for 1990-1993 - Eurostat (1994); for 1994 - Eurostat (1995); for 1995-1998 - Eurostat (2000:61).

Graph 2: Male and female youth unemployment rates (seasonally adjusted, %) in the EU, 1988, 1992 and 1998

Sources: Data for 1998 - Eurostat (2000:61); for 1992 - Eurostat (1994); for 1988 - Eurostat (1990:45).

Graph 3: Number of pupils and students in all levels of education (ISCED 1-7), upper secondary education (ISCED 2), in higher education (ISCED 5-7) in EU-15 and Greece, 1975-1992

Source: Eurostat (1995:272, 284, 288)


1An exception here are Germany, the Netherlands Austria and Luxemburg where youth unemployment rates are low (see Table 2).

2Young people need more time to find a suitable job compared to adults.

3Those endorsing this approach argue that young people 'do not accept work discipline.. show little enthusiasm for the work itself', their personal appearance is not the appropriate one, lack appropriate skills and qualifications (Jackson 1985:50).

4It is claimed that young people themselves may lack motivation to search for a job or are unwilling 'to accept certain kinds of jobs: in particular the low paid jobs which involve a great deal of repetitive work'. This is because young people 'rely on their families for support' (an explanation which can be applied to Greece) [and on] the benefits they receive from the state' (Jackson 1985:53).

5This issue remains unresearched in Greece and will be the focus of our future research.

6Westergaard (1992) identified four different versions of the underclass thesis. First, there are the agnostics, arguing for need of more research to evaluate the analytical usefulness of the argument (Smith 1992a; Smith 1992b; Westergaard 1992). Second, there are those who reject the underclass thesis and an empirically unsupported ideological red herring (Bagguley and Mann 1992). Third, the individualist/culturalist theories, which put emphasis on anti-social actions, welfare dependency moral irresponsibility and deviant behaviour. An exemplar of this position is Murray's (1990) work; he argues that single motherhood, unemployment and crime are interwoven in the cultural reproduction of the underclass. Fourth, structural accounts ( Dahrendorf 1987); here the underclass is seen as an outcome of social and economic change (absence of legitimate employment due to deregulation of the labour market and increasing flexibility). In much of the debate, there is emphasis on the youthfulness of the protagonists (MacDonald 1997:19).

7The unemployment rate in Greece started to increase sharply since the early 1980s, it remained in high levels all though the 1980s and it increased again from the early 1990s onwards (see Table 1). Thus from 2% in 1973 it reached 7.2% in 1984 and 9.4% in 1999 - slightly below the EU average (9.6%) (European Commission 1999: 104-105). With these rates Greece is classified as a country with medium unemployment rates, since they are comparatively low when compared with other EU countries (see Table 1). However, there are considerable regional variations. In 1995, in some regions, such as Crete, unemployment rates run below 6%, whereas in others these range from 8% to 10% (eg: Thrace, East Macedonia) and yet in others the unemployment rate is more than 20% (eg: West Macedonia), that is well above the EU average 10.7% (Eurostat 1996). The extent of long-term unemployment is also relatively high, in that in 1995, 4.8% of the unemployed have been out of work for more than 12 months (Demekas and Kontolemis 1997b:58). Long term unemployment is particularly affecting women and young people (Ketsetzopoulou and Bouzas 1996:154-160). In 1995, the long term unemployment rates for women are three times higher (8.5%) than that for men (2.5%) (Demekas and Kontolemis 1997b:58).

8Educational attainment which once upon a time (especially during the 1960s and 1970s) was one of the factors that helped secure a job and upward social mobility (Tsoukalas 1987; 1993) has now lost its value.

9Post-school transition directly into primary employment.

10Transition via a variety of experiences, such as unemployment, underemployment, a variety of programmes.

11They become trapped and develop 'alternative careers' which often involve illegal activities (see Craine 1997:145-149).

12Ferrera (1996) identified some common traits of the welfare states in the four main southern European countries. These are: fragmented and 'corporatist' income maintenance system; dualistic system of income maintenance with higher protected beneficiaries (eg: public employees, white collar workers, private wage earners of medium and large enterprises working on full contract with job security) on the one hand, who receive generous replacement benefits and pensions, and under-protected workers and citizens on the other (eg: irregular workers in weak sectors with no job security, workers in the informal sector, unemployed), who draw meagre benefits; the establishment of National Health Systems based on universalistic principles; persistence of clientelism and patronage and high vulnerability of public institutions to partisan pressures and manipulations; low degree of state penetration of the welfare sphere and a 'highly collusive mix between public and non public actors and institutions' (ibid).

13Until the late 1970s, welfare state policies were rudimentary in Greece and a debate on the need for a welfare state was almost non-existent (Petmezidou 1996: 325). 'The dominant view in society was that economic development and the ensuing general improvement of the standard of living would be enough to alleviate such problems' ( ibid). The expansion of social protection occurred in the first half of the 1980s, when the shrinking of the welfare state was taking place in most of western Europe, because of economic recession.

14All major parties have exploited the unemployment problem in Greece for purposes of re-election. The first favour asked of elected representatives by Greek voters is to find them a job in the public sector. According to estimates by the New Democracy party, 80% of requests by party members are for employment in the civil service (Samatas 1993). Each party tends to their own - I diki mas - delegates thus work as party employment agencies, exchanging jobs for votes.

15In a survey carried out in 1996 by Katsikas and Kavadias (1996) (cited in INE/GSEE 1996) 51% of graduates of upper secondary education and 47% of graduates of higher education said that the most important factor in finding a job was having access to political networks. Only 1% of graduates of higher education considered that high educational qualifications in itself can lead to a job.

16This is a powerful metaphor for people who 'currently account for nothing and appear to be going nowhere' (Williamson 1997:78).

17There is a 'flat rate allowance for children who are not supported (decree 147/89), flat rate living allowance for repatriates (decree 57/73), a benefit for people undergoing severe hardship (law 1331/83), flat rate maternity allowance for mothers with no financial support (law 1331/84), flat rate payment towards housing benefit, means tested benefit awarded to refugees of Greek origin coming from Eastern Europe, Egypt or Albania, family allowances for Greek repatriates, flat rate allowance for single parent families (decree 147/89), heating allowance for handicapped people and family allowance for those covered by the Organisation of Agricultural Insurance (OGA) scheme (European Commission 1999a:526, 534).

18A thorough evaluation of the impact of ESF funding on Greece is lacking.

19Of particular importance to young people are: Lingua (1987), Erasmus (1987), Comett (1986), Petra (1987), Youth for Europe (1998), Euroform, Now and Horizon.

20Youthstart I identified the following target groups: young people living in mountainous areas or islands (22%), young people with inadequate qualifications (35%), young repatriates (6%), young graduates of secondary education (34%), ex-drug users (3%); training of personel (3%). YOUTHSTART II was also directed (apart from the above mentioned groups) to the following groups: high-school graduates, young farmers, young people with phychological problems and/ or special needs, high school or technical school graduates, school drop- outs, young people with other health problems (National Labour Institute 1998). The percentages mentioned above refer to percentage of programmes. Unfortunately such figures are not available for YOUTHSTART II. An evaluation of the first phase of YOUTHSTART is not, however, yet available and that it is too early to make any estimates for the second phase.

21The following main public institutions are responsible for the co-ordination and implementation of YOUTHSTART 1 and 2: Ministry of Labour, National Labour Institute, while numerous private and public institutions such as OAED, Centres for Vocational Training (KEKs), local authorities, non-governmental organisations etc. are responsible for its implementation.

22This section is based on fifteen semi- structured interviews we conducted in 1998 and 1999 in Athens with key informants, working in agencies and institutions responsible for implementing programmes like Youthstart. These include: OAED (Greek Manpower Employment Organisation), GGLE (General Secretariat of Greek Diaspora), EIYAPOE (National Institute for Reception and Integration of Refugees), Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Justice, INE/GSEE (Institute of Labour/Greek General Confederation of Labour), EIE (National Institute of Labour), ERGOPLAN (independent private company participating in employment generating schemes).

23When a programme is submitted for funding, this has various partners, ranging from local authorities, universities, representatives of the local business community.


ALLATT, P. and YEADLE, S. (1992) Youth unemployment and the family: voices of disordered times, London: Routledge.

ALLEN, Sh. and WATON, A. (1986) "The effects of unemployment: experience and response", in Sh. Allen, A. Waton, K. Purcell and St. Wood (eds), The experience of unemployment, pp. 1-16, London: Macmillan.

ANTAL, A. B. (1990) Making ends meet: corporate responses to youth unemployment in Britain and Germany, London: Pinter.

BALDWIN D., COLES B., and MITCHELL W. , "The formation of an underclass or disparate processes of social exclusion? Evidence from two groups of 'vulnerable youth'" in in R. MacDonald, (1997) (ed), Youth, the 'underclass' and social exclusion, London: Routledge, pp. 83-95.

BAGGULEY, P. and MANN, K. (1992) 'Idle thieving bastards? Scholarly representations of the "underclass"', Work, Employment and Society, 6 (1): 113-26.

BLAKELY, G. (1990) Youth policy, London: Routledge in association with the University of Bradford and Spicers Centre for Europe Ltd.

BROWN, Ph. and CROMPTON, R. (eds) (1994) A new Europe? Economic restructuring and social exclusion, London: UCL Press.

CAVOUNIDIS, J. (1996) " Social welfare services and the fight against social exclusion", in H. Katsoulis (ed), Dimensions of social exclusion, Vol. 1, Athens: National Centre for Social Research, pp. 252-271.

CEDEFOP (1992a) Occupational and qualification structures in the field of educational and vocational guidance for young people and adults in Greece, Spain and Italy, Berlin: CEDEFOP.

CEDEFOP (1992b) Support policies for business start-ups and the role of training. National reports from Portugal, Belgium, Greece: Synthesis Report Berlin: CEDEFOP.

CEDEFOP (1995) Determining the need for vocational counseling among different target groups of young people under 28 years of age in the European Community, Berlin: CEDEFOP, 2nd edition.

CEDEFOP (1997) Austria, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, Berlin: CEDEFOP.

CHTOURIS, S. (1992) Dimensions of poverty and least privileged groups: the role of the family in social protection, Athens: Praxis (in Greek).

COLEMAN, J. C.. (1992) " The nature of adolescence ", in J. C. Coleman and Ch. Warren-Adamson (eds), Youth policy in the 1990s: the way forward, London: Routledge, pp. 8-27.

COLES, B. (1995) Youth and social policy: youth citizenship and young careers, London: UCL Press Limited.

CRAINE St., (1997), The black 'magic roundabout': cyclical transitions and alternative careers, in in R. MacDonald, (1997) (ed), Youth, the 'underclass' and social exclusion, London: Routledge, pp.130- 152.

DAHRENDORF, R. (1987), The underclass and the future of Britain, 10th Annual Lecture, Windsor: St. George's House. DEAKIN, B. M. (1995) The youth labour market in Britain: the role of intervention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

DEMEKAS, D. G. and KONTOLEMIS, Z. G. (1997a) Labour market performance and institutions in Greece, South European Society and Politics, 2 (2): 80-114.

DEMEKAS, D. G. and KONTOLEMIS, Z. G. (1997b) Unemployment in Greece: a survey of issues, Working Paper No. 97/17, Badia Fiesolana: European University Institute.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1995) Employment in Europe, Luxembourg: European Commission.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1999a) Social protection in the member states of the European Union: MISSOC (Community Information System on Social Protection), Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1999b) European Economy, Vol. 68, pp.104-105.

EUROSTAT (1990) Eurostatistics: data for short term economic analysis, Vol. 11/12, Luxenbourg:OOPEC.

EUROSTAT (1994) Eurostatistics: data for short term economic analysis, Vol.12, Luxembourg: OOPEC.

EUROSTAT (1995) Eurostatistics: data for short term economic analysis, Vol.12, Luxembourg: OOPEC.

EUROSTAT (1995) Education across the European Union: statistics and indicators, Luxembourg: OOPEC.

EUROSTAT (1996), Regions: statistical yearbook, Luxembourg: OOPEC.

EUROSTAT (2000) Eurostatistics: data for short term economic analysis, Vol. 2, Luxembourg: OOPEC.

FEND, H. (1994) "The historical context of transition to work and youth unemployment", in C. Petersen and J.T. Mortimer (eds), Youth unemployment and society, pp. 77-94 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

FERRERA, M. (1996) " The 'Southern model' of welfare in social Europe", Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 6 (1): 17- 37.

FRAGNIERE, G. and DOORTEN, K. (1983) Employment and youth policy, Maastricht: European Centre for Work and Society.

FURNHAM, A. (1994) "The psychological consequences of youth unemployment", in C. Petersen and J. T. Mortimer (eds), Youth unemployment and society, pp. 199-226Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

GREEN J. K., MULROY S., and O' NEILL M. (1997), Young people and prostitution from a youth service perspective, in D.Barrett (ed.), Child prostitution in Britain, London: The Children's Society, pp. 90-105.

HARRIS, N. S. (1989) Social security for young people, Aldershot: Avebury.

HART, P. E. (1988) Youth unemployment in Great Britain, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

INE/GSEE (1996), "Unemployment: a major threat in Greece and Europe: young people the victims" , Enimerosi, Vol 20 (in Greek).

JACKSON, M. P. (1985) Youth unemployment, London: Croom Helm.

JONES, G. and WALLACE, Cl. (1992) Youth, citizenship and family, Buckingham: Open University Press.

KARANTINOS, D. CAVOUNIDIS, J. IOANNOU, Cr. KONIORDOS, M. and TINIOS, Pl. (1992) EC Observatory on national policies to combat social exclusion. Consolidated Report Greece, Athens: National Centre for Social Research/ Commission of the European Communities.

KATROUGALOS, G. S. (1996) "The south European welfare model: the Greek welfare state, in search for an identity", Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 6 (1): 39-60.

KATSIKAS, Ch. and KAVADIAS, G. (1996) H elliniki ekpaideusi ston orizonta tou 2000 (Greek Education in the year 2000), Athens: Gutenberg (in Greek).

KETSETZOPOULOU, M. and BOUZAS, N. (1996) "Labour market function and social exclusion" in H. Katsoulis (ed), Dimensions of social exclusion, Vol. 1, Athens: National Centre for Social Research, pp. 137-170.

LAZARIDIS, G. (1995) "Sexuality and its Cultural Construction in Western Crete", in Journal of Gender Studies, Vol. 4, No.3, pp 281-295.

LAZOS, C. G. (1995) Youth policies in the European Union: structures and training, Luxembourg: OOPEC.

LEONTIDOU, L. (1993) "Informal strategies of unemployment relief in Greek cities: the relevance of family, locality and housing", European Planning Studies, 1 (1): 43-68.

LYNCH, L. M. (1984) State dependency in youth unemployment: a lost generation, Discussion Paper No. 184, Centre for Labour Economics, London: London School of Economics.

MACDONALD, R. (ed) (1997) Youth, and 'Underclass' and Social Exclusion, London:Routledge.

MALOUTAS, Th. and ECONOMOU, D. (1988) " Welfare state: its Greek version" , in Th. Maloutas and D. Economou (eds) Problems in the development of the welfare state in Greece, pp.13-55, Athens: Exantas.

MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS (1998) Community Initiative 'Employment'- YOUTHSTART 1997-99: Greece. Catalogue of the approved projects, Athens: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (in Greek).

MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS (1996) Community Initiative 'Employment'- YOUTHSTART 1994-96: Greece. Catalogue of the approved projects, Athens: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (in Greek).

MINGIONE, E. and CONTIERO, G. (undated), Youth unemployment in Southern Europe, <>(Site no longer exists)

MURRAY, C. (1990), The emerging British underclass, London: Institute of Economic Affairs.

NATIONAL LABOUR INSTITUTE (1996) Catalogue of the approved projects under the Community Initiatives NOW- YOUTHSTART-HORIZON 1994-96, Athens: Offset.


NATIONAL LABOUR INSTITUTE (1999a) Catalogue of the approved projects under the Community Initiatives NOW- YOUTHSTART-HORIZON 1994-96, Athens:

NATIONAL LABOUR INSTITUTE, (1999b), Persiskopio tis apasxolisis (Employment Observatory), vol. 11, August, Athens : NLI.

OECD (1994) The OECD jobs study, Paris: OECD.

OECD (1995) Employment Outlook, Paris: OECD.

ORSZAG, M. and SNOWER, D. J. (1997) Youth unemployment and government policy, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.

PETERSEN, A. C. and MORTIMER, J. T. (eds) (1994) Youth unemployment and society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

PETMESIDOU, M. (1996) " Social protection in Greece: a brief glimpse of a welfare state", Social Policy and Administration, 30 (4): 324-347.

PETMESIDOU, M. (1991) " Statism, social policy and the middle classes in Greece", Journal of European Social Policy, 1 (1): 31-48.

POPPLE, K. and KIRBY, R. (1997) "Winners and losers: young people in Europe", in T. Spybey (ed.) Britain in Europe, pp.161- 172, London: Routledge.

RAJAN, A. (1990) Vocational training scenarios for some member states of the European Community: a synthesis report for France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, Berlin: CEDEFOP.

REES, T. L. and ATKINSON, P. (1982) Youth unemployment and state intervention, London: Routledge and K. Paul.

ROBERTS K. , (1997), "Is there an emerging British 'underclass'? The evidence from youth research" , in R. MacDonald, (1997) (ed), Youth, the 'underclass' and social exclusion, London: Routledge, pp. 39- 54.

SAMATAS M., (1993), " Debureaucratizarion Failure in post-dictatorial Greece: a sociopolitical control approach", Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 11 (2): 187-217.

SMITH, D. (ed) (1992a) Understanding the Underclass, London: Policy Studies Institute.

SMITH, D. (1992b) "The Future of the Underclass", in D. Smith (ed.) Understanding the Underclass, London: Policy Studies Institute.

STATHOPOULOS, P. (1996) " Greece: what future for the welfare state?", in V. George and P. Taylor-Gooby (eds), European welfare policy : squaring the welfare circle, pp. 136-154, London: Macmillan.

SYMEONIDOU, H. (1995) " Formal and informal forms of social protection in Greece", in G. Kiriopoulos (ed), Health, social protection and family, pp. 239-254, Athens: Centre of Health Sciences, (in Greek).

SYMES, V. (1995) Unemployment in Europe, London: Routledge.

TSOUKALAS K. (1987), State, society and work, Athens: Themelio. (in Greek).

TSOUKALAS, K. (1993), Social development and the state: the construction of the public sector in Greece, Athens: Themelio, 5th edition, (in Greek).

WALLACE, Cl. (1987) For richer, for poorer: young people in and out of work, London: Tavistock Publications.

WESTERGAARD , J. (1992), ' About and beyond the underclass: some notes on influences of social climate on British sociology', Sociology, 26: 575-87.

WILKINSON, C. (1995), The drop-out society: young people at the margin, Leicester: Youth Work Press.

WILKINSON, C. and MULGAN, G. (1995), Freedom's children, London: Demos.

WILLIAMSON, H. (1997a) Youth and policy: contexts and consequences. Young men, transition and social exclusion, Aldershot: Ashgate.

WILLIAMSON, H. (1997b), "Status ZerO youth and the 'underclass': some considerations' , in R. MacDonald, (1997) (ed), Youth, the 'underclass' and social exclusion, London: Routledge, pp. 70-82.

ZANNI-TELIOPOULOU, K. (1995) Determining the need for vocational counseling among different target groups of young people under 28 years of age in the European Community: young people's need for vocational guidance in Greece, Berlin: CEDEFOP.

Copyright Sociological Research Online, 2001